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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Security Committee

SECOM-D-306
27 January 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Walter Elder
Executive Secretary, NFIB

FROM:
Acting Chairman

SUBJECT: Security Compartmentation

REFERENCE: DCI/IC 78-5006, dated 12 January 1978, subject:
Proposed DCID on Compartmentation

1. This responds to your request (reference) for an identification of issues and problems bearing on compartmentation, and a description of who is doing what about them.

2. As you noted, General Tighe's recent memorandum soliciting DCI support for early NFIB action on a proposed DCID on compartmentation is but one of several recent expressions of concern from Defense about the pace of pending actions on compartmentation. The Joint Chiefs of Staff brought up the subject for discussion during their 20 January 1978 meeting with the DCI.

3. The proposed compartmentation DCID derives from a 1976 initiative by Defense, presented as a means of redressing the balance between protection and utility of intelligence information. That initiative was referred to the Security Committee. Sharp divisions in the Community have stalled action at our level on trying to develop a directive establishing clear policies on what should be compartmented and effective procedures for doing so. Those with a "collection" orientation generally favor the status quo, under which the DCI collection committees or program managers both assert what needs to be compartmented and develop the protective measures they deem appropriate. Those with a "user" orientation want a change which would provide a better balance between a collector's assertions on restrictive security measures and the users' needs to get the collected information in a manner which permits its full and timely application. The "users" generally view present arrangements as institutionalizing a bias in favor of strict protection and unreceptive to Community needs for access under readily manageable conditions.

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A majority on the Security Committee sought to attain this improved balance through having the proposed DCID make the Committee itself responsible for determining what needs to be compartmented. A copy of their proposed DCID is attached for information (see Attachment A). The Committee Staff, believing that neither it nor the Committee as a collegial body has the technical expertise to make such a determination, proposed a different approach without much success. That approach is that: (1) those intimately knowledgeable of the collection environment propose information elements for compartmentation; (2) the Security Committee comment on the feasibility of protecting the information at both compartmented and non-compartmented classified levels; (3) Community agencies with interests in using the information comment on the impact the compartmentation proposal would have on their responsibilities; (4) a senior staff advisor to the DCI review these inputs from an overall Community point of view and recommend a balanced position to the DCI for final approval; and (5) the Security Committee play the leading role in developing the administrative procedures to apply the DCI's decision.

25X1 4. ☐ The slow pace of action on the proposed compartmentation DCID is unfortunately paralleled in other actions underway which bear on compartmentation in some manner. Some of the delay is due to the complexity of the subject and to the need for wide-ranging coordination. In other cases, different problems have contributed to slow action. In any event, the lack of much in the way of specific accomplishment fuels the concerns expressed by DIA. Significant pending actions bearing on compartmentation include:

25X1 a. ☐ Simplification of security policy for space intelligence matters. A proposal on this was developed by an ad hoc Community group convened by the DCI in January 1976. Specific recommendations were sent to the President by the DCI in November 1976, but were held over and subsumed in the space policy review (PRM-23). The security recommendations from that are very close to the November 1976 ones, but are not yet final pending further consideration of the draft Presidential Directive. Until this is acted upon, no changes can be made in the system of security controls for intelligence satellite product. The Security Committee staff provided support on security issues involved in this effort.

25X1 b. ☐ Revision of Executive Order 11652 on security classification. The new draft Order developed in response to PRM-29 will require, among other things, that intelligence compartments be continued or established only upon personal DCI approval after consideration of the balance between protection and use and assessment of attendant security factors. Compartments will also be subject to periodic

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review requirements leading to cancellation, change, or re-affirmation. A mechanism to support the DCI in these regards is needed. A Security Committee staff member participated in the PRM-29 effort and was one of the drafters for the new Order.

25X1 c. ☐ Central computer data base to record and manage compartmented accesses. The NFIB concurred in a concept for such (the 4C's System) in 1975, but disagreement on funding precluded implementation; funding is still an issue. Further examination of the concept suggests that its management benefits are well worth the cost. The Security Committee is staffing a new proposal on this system for DCI consideration.

25X1 d. ☐ Uniform administrative system for compartmented data. The Security Committee developed, and the NFIB has for comment, a proposed DCID to bring all administrative procedures for handling and controlling such data together into one regulation. Some agency comments on the proposal counsel delay until the new Executive Order on security classification is approved.

25X1 e. ☐ Updating of Community security policy on travel and assignment of persons with compartmented access. Strong Community differences on the subject have delayed decision. Legal issues were raised and explored. The Security Committee has developed, and the NFIB has for comment, an up-to-date proposed DCID on this matter. Comments show that Community differences will have to be resolved by DCI decision.

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25X1 g. ☐ Updating of the Communication Intelligence Security Regulations. The SIGINT Committee has been working for about a year on a draft revision of this directive. More review and coordination is needed.

25X1 5. ☐ A factor that does not contribute to timely action on security matters is the division of responsibility for the subject, both by directive and by practice. With regard to compartmentation:

25X1 a. ☐ DCID 1/11, the Security Committee's charter, assigns a mission to "review special security and compartmentation

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procedures and develop proposals for any necessary changes to achieve optimum use of intelligence consistent with protection of sensitive intelligence sources and methods." ☐

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25X1 b. ☐ COMIREX, which is primarily responsible for advising on the collection, processing, and exploitation of imagery, is also tasked by its charter (DCID 1/13) to develop "special security control" procedures for imagery product. They, not the Security Committee, develop the administrative directives specifying how such product is to be protected.

25X1 c. ☐ The SIGINT Committee, which is primarily responsible for advising on the collection and use of SIGINT, is tasked by its charter (DCID 6/1) to study and prepare recommendations on the "degree and type of security protection" to be afforded SIGINT and on associated administrative procedures.

25X1 d. ☐ An ad hoc group, not the Security Committee, was tasked last year to review security and compartmentation from an overall Community standpoint and to develop implementation plans for improvements. This, the Senior Security Study Group, was set up in response to a suggestion by the then Director, DIA, who believed that such would accelerate the pace of meaningful action on compartmentation.

25X1 6. ☐ Both policy and practice show that the DCI does not have a single focal point for Community security policy matters, as opposed to a single security advisor for operational security matters bearing on CIA. The concerns increasingly voiced by Defense are of Community character. They appear to seek an institutional approach which would give both the substance and the appearance of balanced consideration of the competing parochial interests of separate Community entities. Some arrangement to that effect will be needed to comply with the revision of E.O. 11652, which will require the protective features of present and proposed compartments to be balanced against the "full spectrum of needs to use the information" involved. It would seem that that balance would not be served by permitting either collectors or consumers to have a preponderant role in recommending security policy. Both have to contribute to the process, because no one else can speak with their experience and technical knowledge. But someone without a vested interest in the outcome should be closely involved in the balancing process and in the follow-through administration after the DCI has made his decision.

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25X1 7. ☐ Attached for your consideration is a suggested reply (Attachment B) for the DCI to send General Tighe. It states a plan to schedule an NFIB discussion on compartmentation, on the assumption that the DCI would believe such necessary and desirable. If the DCI concurs in such an approach, we will prepare a talking paper for his use.

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Attachments:

- A. Proposed DCID on Compartmentation
- B. DCI Memo to D/DIA

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